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NOTES
And Justice for All: Wayte v. United States and
the Defense of Selective Prosecution
In criminal law enforcement the government exercises broad discretion in
choosing cases for prosecution.' "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause
to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion." 2 Nevertheless, selective prosecution
constitutes a valid defense to a criminal charge when based on an impermissible
criterion such as race,3 religion, or the exercise of protected statutory and consti-
tutional rights.4 Although the defense is rooted in equal protection, s other con-
stitutional provisions, such as the first amendment right to free speech, may
sometimes be involved.6 According to the recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ment in Wayte v. United States,7 a passive enforcement policy under which the
government selects for prosecution only those who report themselves or are re-
ported by others as having violated the law does not abridge either the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech or the fifth amendment's implied guaran-
1. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982) (prosecutor has broad discretion
to select the charges against an accused).
2. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). In deciding whether to file criminal
charges, prosecutors may consider a wide range of factors, such as the nature of the offense, the
likelihood of conviction, the deterrent effect of the prosecution, the defendant's past criminal activ-
ity, and the defendant's willingness to assist the government in prosecuting others. United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794-95 & n.15 (1977); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180-81 (3d
Cir. 1973); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). "The presumption is always
that a prosecution for violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators to justice." United States v. Falk,
479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane).
3. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "Within the limits set by the legisla-
ture's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, 'the conscious exercise of some selectiv-
ity in enforcement is not itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as 'the selection was [not]
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifica-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). For a general discussion of the
defense of selective prosecution, see Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 732 (1979).
4. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). "For while an individual certainly
may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for exercising a
protected statutory or constitutional right." Id.
5. Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1531 (1985) (selective prosecution claims should be
judged according to "ordinary equal protection standards"); see also Givelber, The Application of
Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88
(discussing equal protection analysis of selective prosecution defenses).
6. See Comment, Selective Prosecution for Failure to Registerfor the Draft: Have First Amend-
ment Rights Been Infringed?, 53 U. CN. L. REv. 765 (1984); Case Comment, United States v.
Wayte: The Big Chill on Vocal Draft Nonregistrants, 60 NoTRE DAME L. Rv. 102 (1984); Note,
Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment Context, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 144 (1984);
see also United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane) (discrimination on basis of
protected first amendment activities forbidden); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir.
1972) (selective enforcement of regulation controlling the use of public concourse of Pentagon vio-
lated first amendment).
7. 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
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tee of equal protection.8 This Note examines the history and development of the
selective prosecution defense, the reasoning and logic behind the Court's deci-
sion in Wayte, and the possible effects of that decision on future cases involving
selective prosecution.
On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued a Presidential Proclamation that
required all male citizens born in or after 1960 to register with the Selective
Service System.9 Pursuant to the Proclamation, the Selective Service adopted a
policy of passive enforcement. 10 Under that system it referred to the Justice
Department for investigation and possible prosecution only those men who re-
ported their refusal to register or who were reported by third parties.1 1 To per-
suade nonregistrants to comply with the law, the Department of Justice
instituted a "beg" policy, whereby it notified nonregistrants by mail that unless
they registered within a specified time, prosecution would be considered.12
8. Id. at 1534-35. The first amendment of the United States Constitution reads in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Although the fifth amendment, unlike the fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection
clause as such, its due process clause has been held to embody the equal protection concept. Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The Supreme Court's current "approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims [is] precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Weinberger v. Wisenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
9. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1527 (citing Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1980), reprinted In
50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1982)). The relevant section of the Military Selective Service Act provides:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male
person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any
subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself
for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such man-
ner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations
prescribed hereunder.
50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (a) (1982). Upon signing the Proclamation, President Carter stated that he was
"deeply concerned about the unwarranted and vicious invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union
and occupation by them of this innocent and defenseless country." Presidential Remarks on Signing
Proclamation 4771, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1274 (July 2, 1980). He viewed the institution
of draft registration as a precautionary measure "designed to make our country strong and to main-
tain peace." Id. at 1275. The President also "emphasize[d] that the registration act is not a draft
.... [S]eparate legal action would be required by Congress. . . to initiate a draft ... " Id. at
1274.
10. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1528.
11. Id. In furtherance of its passive enforcement policy, the Selective Service sent letters on
June 17, 1981, to all reported violators, stating that it had information that the person was required
to register but had not done so, requesting that the person comply with the law, and warning that a
violation could result in criminal prosecution. Wayte received a copy of this letter, but did not
respond. Later the Selective Service transmitted to the Department of Justice the names of Wayte
and 133 other young men identified under its passive enforcement system, all of whom had not
registered in response to the Service's earlier letter. Id.
12. Id. Although the Justice Department relied upon initial referrals from the Selective Service
pursuant to the passive enforcement system, it had its own procedures for handling cases once re-
ferred. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Wayte. A September 28, 1982, Justice Department memorandum
stated that the prosecution policy for all nonregistration cases required alleged nonregistrants to be
notified by registered mail that unless they registered within a specified time, prosecution would be
considered. In addition, FBI agents were to interview alleged nonregistrants if they continued to
refuse to register. The memorandum described the policy as "designed to ensure that (1) the refusal
to register is willful and (2) only persons who are most adamant in their refusal to register will be
prosecuted." Id. Testifying before the district court, a senior legal advisor in the Department of
Justice defined the "beg" policy: "'We ask you to register, and if you register any time before
indictment, we do not prosecute you.'" Id. (citing Jt. App. 862, testimony of David Kline).
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Under this policy, those who registered late were not prosecuted, while those
who never registered were investigated further 1
3
David Wayte fell within the class required to register, but did not do so.
14
Instead he wrote to the Selective Service and the President, declaring that he had
not registered and did not intend to register. 15 Wayte received a "beg" letter,
but failed to respond.' 6 In 1982 he was indicted for knowingly and willfully
failing to register in violation of the Military Selective Service Act.17
In the United States District Court for the Central District of California,
Wayte moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution.' 8
After a pre-trial hearing, the district court concluded Wayte had established a
prima facie case of selective prosecution and shifted the burden to the govern-
ment to prove otherwise. 19 The court ordered the government to provide Wayte
with documents relating to the prosecution of noregistrants and to make presi-
13. Wayte, 105 S. CL at 1528.
14. Id. at 1527.
15. Id. On August 4, 1980, Wayte wrote to the President, "I decided to obey my conscience
rather than your law. I did not register for your draft. Nor will I ever cooperate with yours or any
other military system, despite the laws I might break or the consequences which may befall me." Id.
at 1527-28 n.2. Similarly, in a letter to the Selective Service, Wayte stated, "I have not registered for
the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and I accept
them." Id.
16. Id. Subsequently, the President announced a grace period to afford nonregistrants a further
opportunity to register without penalty, which lasted from January 7, 1982, until February 28, 1982.
Wayte still did not register. On June 28, 1982, FBI agents interviewed Wayte, and he continued to
refuse to register. Id. at 1529. By the time Wayte was indicted on July 22, 1982, it had been almost
2 years since he wrote his first letter protesting the draft registration on August 4, 1980. Id. at 1527
n.2, 1529.
17. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1529 (citing Military Selective Service Act, Pub. L. No. 80-759, §§ 3,
12(a), 62 Stat. 604, 605, 622 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 453, 462(a) (1982)). For text
of § 453(a), see supra note 9. Section 462(a) provides:
[A]ny... person who.., evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces or
any of the requirements of this title. . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than
five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both.
50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1982).
18. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. CL 1524 (1985).
19. Id. at 1382. To determine if Wayte had established a prima facie case, the district court
applied a two-prong test developed in United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974),
and applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975). Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1380. That
test requires the defendant to show (1) that others similarly situated generally have not been prose-
cuted for conduct similar to the defendant's, and (2) that the government's discriminatory selection
was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or exercise of the defendant's first amend-
ment right of free speech. Id.
The court held Wayte had satisfied the first requirement because he had shown that out of over
500,000 nonregistrants the 13 indicted had all been vocal nonregistrants. Id. at 1379 & n.3. In
addition, because the government had access to Social Security and motor vehicle registration
records in many states, "[the inference is strong [that] the government could have located non-vocal
non-registrants, but chose not to." Id. at 1381. The court found the second requirement was also
met because an enforcement procedure that focuses upon the vocal offender is inherently suspect, the
government was aware that a disproportionate number of vocal nonregistrants would be prosecuted
under the passive enforcement system, and the involvement of high government officials in
prosecutorial decisions strongly suggested impermissible selective prosecution. Id. at 1381-82.
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dential advisor Edwin Meese 11120 available to testify at an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of selective prosecution.2 1 Citing executive privilege, the govern-
ment refused to comply. 22 The district court therefore dismissed the indictment
on the ground that the government had failed to rebut the prima facie finding.23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's dismissal.24 The majority conceded that defendant had established
that he was singled out for prosecution from others similarly situated.2 5 The
court noted, however, that Wayte had failed to demonstrate that the government
had purposefully focused its investigation on him because of his protest activi-
ties.26 Rather, the evidence suggested only that the government was aware that
the passive enforcement system would result in the prosecution of religious and
vocal objectors. 27 Moreover, the court accepted the government's justifications
for its passive enforcement policy: (1) the identities of nonreported nonregis-
trants were not known, and (2) nonregistrants who expressed their refusal to
register made clear their willful violation of the law.28 Because Wayte presented
no evidence that he was prosecuted because he had exercised his first amend-
20. Mr. Meese has since been nominated and confirmed as United States Attnorney General.
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
21. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n.1. The district court examined in camera government docu-
ments related to the prosecution of draft nonregistrants. Id. at 1385. Based on this information, the
court concluded that the government's normal prosecutorial procedure was not followed in draft
nonregistration cases. Id. at 1382. Ordinarily, U.S. Attorneys would ultimately decide which nonre-
gistrants to prosecute. Yet government documents indicated that the White House had an interest in
the prosecution of nonregistrants and that both Meese and a Presidential Military Manpower Task
Force had expressed concern over the potential consequences of passive enforcement on vocal nonre-
gistrants. The district court stated that "[tihe involvement of Mr. Meese and the Task Force in
prosecutorial policy decisions creates, at the very least, a strong inference of impropriety with regard
to the Government's motive in seeking the prosecution of this defendant, and others similarly situ-
ated." Id.
22. Id. at 1378 & n.1.
23. Id. at 1385. Applying a balancing test, the court determined that "[t]he Government's
generalized assertion of a 'deliberate process' executive privilege must yield to the defendant's spe-
cific need for documents. . . ." Id. at 1378 n.1.
24. United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
Several commentators have written on the court of appeals decision in Wayte. See Comment, United
States v. Wayte: The Use of Selective Prosecution as a Defense in Cases Concerning Avoidance of
Draft Registration, 6 CraM. JusT. J. 345 (1983); Case Comment, supra note 6; Note, United States v.
Wayte: Selective Prosecution and the Right to Dissent, 14 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 58 (1984);
Note, Uncle Sam Wants You: Selective Prosecution of Draft Nonregistrants, 16 Loy. U. CH. L.J.
115 (1984); Note, Constitutional Law--Passive Enforcement of Draft Registration: Does It Constitute
Selective Prosecution in Violation of Equal Protection Because It Discriminates Against Persons Based
on Their Exercise of First Amendment Rights?-United States v. Wayte, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 671 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Passive Enforcement].
25. Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387. The court of appeals applied the same test as the district court:
"To establish selective prosecution, a defendant must show that others similarly situated have not
been prosecuted and that the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive." Id. The court
agreed with the district court's finding that the first element of the test had been established by
defendant's showing that out of over 500,000 nonregistrants the 13 indicted had all been vocal
nonregistrants. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court of appeals stated that conscious exercise of some selectivity in prosecution is
not constitutionally impermissible unless it is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard. Id.
(citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th
Cir. 1972)).
28. Id. at 1388.
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ment rights, and the government's justifications for its passive enforcement sys-
tem defeated the inference of improper motive, the court concluded that Wayte
had failed to make an initial prima facie showing of selective prosecution.29
Thus, he was not entitled to discovery of government documents and
testimony. 3
0
Recognizing both the importance of the issue of selective prosecution and a
division in the circuit courts over the appropriate criteria to apply, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 3 1 For the first time, the Supreme
Court would address the defense of selective prosecution directly.32 Because
both equal protection and first amendment issues were involved, Wayte posed an
opportunity to clearly define the legal standards and quantum of evidence neces-
sary to raise the defense successfully.
Wayte advanced three first amendment arguments in support of his selec-
tive prosecution defense.33 First, he maintained that expressions of opposition
to draft registration constituted protected political expression.34 Because the
passive enforcement system selected for prosecution only those nonregistrants
who exercised their first amendment right to criticize the draft by writing to
government officials or by voicing their opposition, the system constituted an
29. Id.
30. Id. The majority noted, "That access to the documents might have been helpful to [Wayte]
does not in itself entitle him to discovery... . The government's refusal to comply with the discov-
ery orders was justified." Id.
Judge Schroeder dissented, stating that "Wayte's prosecution was a part of the government's
deliberate policy. . . designed to punish only those who had communicated their violation of the
law to others." Id. at 1389. Because "an enforcement procedure focusing solely upon vocal offend-
ers is inherently suspect," Schroeder contended that the burden of proof should shift to the govern-
ment to show nondiscriminatory intent. Id. at 1390 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). She also observed
that the government's justifications for passive enforcement were unpersuasive because alternate
means of enforcement were available to the government. "The district court noted that a law stu-
dent armed only with a telephone was able to obtain lists, from several randomly chosen states, of
persons legally required to register, those lists could have been compared with the government's list
of actual registrants to locate violators." Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (citing Wayte, 549 F. Supp.
at 1381 & n.6).
31. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1530-31 (1985). In United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1052
(6th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit applied a first amendment analysis to the defense of selective prosecution and held that a
vocal nonregistrant prosecuted under the passive enforcement system was entitled to a full eviden-
tiary hearing on his selective prosecution claim. Conversely, in United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d
1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit applied the traditional two-prong equal protection test and upheld the crimi-
nal conviction of a vocal nonregistrant under the passive enforcement system. For a more detailed
discussion of these two cases, see infra text accompanying notes 113-33.
32. Previously, the Supreme Court had addressed selective prosecution only in dicta in a few
cases. See infra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
33. Brief for Petitioner at 17-39.
34. Id. at 17. Wayte argued that the content of his letters "represent[ed] core political speech
'on public issues [that] has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values."' Id. at 17-18 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
Wayte continued, "'[The First Amendment embodies] a profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."' Id. at 18 n.21 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
According to Wayte, the fact that criticisms of governmental policy may be accompanied by or
construed as confessions does not make such criticisms any less an exercise of first amendment
rights. Id. at 21; see infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
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impermissible content-based regulatory policy that abridged first amendment
rights.35 Second, Wayte asserted that the government's motive in instituting the
passive program was irrelevant to a first amendment analysis of that program's
impact on protected expression. 36 Prior Supreme Court cases had established
the principle that first amendment rights may be abridged even though the in-
fringement was unintended.37 Finally, Wayte argued that the government had
failed to demonstrate that the passive enforcement system furthered a compel-
ling interest and did not unnecessarily limit protected speech. 3 8
The government defended its passive enforcement policy on two grounds. 39
First, the government maintained that it was not impermissibly discriminatory
to select Wayte for prosecution.40 A prosecutor has broad discretion in initiat-
ing a criminal case, not subject to judicial review unless deliberately based on
impermissible considerations. 4 1 In addition, Wayte had failed to show that he
was singled out for prosecution from others similarly situated; 42 and the passive
enforcement system served legitimate governmental interests by encouraging
prosecutorial and cost efficiency, by ensuring convictions only of willful viola-
35. Brief for Petitioner at 22. Wayte noted that only those individuals who wrote and stated
their refusal to register were referred for investigation or potential prosecution, while nonregistrants
who did not confess were ignored. Wayte concluded, "The Selective Service passive enforcement
policy was, therefore, not activated by violation of the draft registration law or even by First Amend-
ment activity in general, but rather was aroused only by First Amendment activity conveying a
particular political message." Id. at 23. Thus, "'such a law visits punishment on people solely
because they have expressed rather than remained silent about their opposition to the government.'"
Id. at 25 (quoting United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1050 (6th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S.
Ct. 1860 (1985)).
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id. at 28. The Supreme Court has held that "'[i]n the domain of. . . indispensable liber-
ties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgement
of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of government
action.'" Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (emphasis added)). Wayte
conceded that motive is relevant to an equal protection analysis of selective prosecution. Id. at 29.
However, he reasserted his position that in this case the passive enforcement policy should be ana-
lyzed under the first amendment, which protects political speech. Id. at 30-31.
38. Id. at 31-39. According to Wayte passive enforcement did not promote general deterrence
because nonregistrants who either did not oppose the draft or opposed it silently escaped prosecu-
tion. Id. at 34. Wayte also maintained that passive enforcement was unnecessary to identify "will-
ful" nonregistrants because the Justice Department's "beg" policy, which notified nonregistrants of
their duty to register and provided an opportunity to avoid prosecution by doing so, could have
accomplished the same goal within an active enforcement system. Id. Finally, Wayte argued that
the government had adequate opportunity to develop an active enforcement system. Id. at 37.
39. Brief for the United States at 18-49.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). The government asserted,
"'The presumption is always that a prosecution for violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good
faith and in a nondiscriminatory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators to
justice."' Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
Thus, defendants have a "heavy burden" to prove that they were selected for prosecution based on
an impermissible motive. Id.
42. Id. at 25. The government advocated the use of a two-prong equal protection test to judge
selective prosecution claims requiring proof of discriminatory effect and motive. Id. at 23-24. The
government emphasized that Wayte had failed to demonstrate that the government knew of both
vocal and nonvocal nonregistrants but chose to prosecute only the vocal ones. Accordingly, he had
failed to establish the first element of the equal protection test: that he was was singled out for
prosecution from among others similarly situated. Id. at 27.
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tors, and by promoting general deterrence.43 Second, the government argued
that Wayte's prosecution did not violate the first amendment. Nonregistrants
were prosecuted because they confessed to violating the registration law, and
these confessions were not protected by the first amendment.44 Thus, the gov-
ernment concluded that Wayte had failed to establish the defense of selective
prosecution.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the government's analysis and announced that selective prosecution de-
fenses should be judged "according to ordinary equal protection standards. ' 45
To successfully assert the defense, a defendant must show that the government's
enforcement policy (1) had a "discriminatory effect" and (2) "was motivated by
a discriminatory purpose."'4 6 The Court held that Wayte had failed to prove
either part of this two-prong test.47 According to the majority, Wayte first had
not presented sufficient evidence that the passive enforcement of draft registra-
tion laws had a discriminatory effect. Wayte had demonstrated only that those
who reported themselves were prosecuted, not that the enforcement policy se-
lected nonregistrants for prosecution on the basis of their speech.48 Under the
"beg" policy, nonregistrants who protested draft registration were not prose-
cuted if they later registered. In addition, no one who engaged in protests of
draft registration, but who was not reported to the government as a violator, was
investigated or prosecuted. 49 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the
43. Id. at 29. The government also maintained that Wayte had failed to prove that he had been
selected for prosecution based on a discriminatory purpose, the second element of the equal protec-
tion test. According to the government, it was admission of nonregistration, not the content of any
criticism or protest of the draft policy, that triggered prosecution. Id. at 30.
Moreover, vocal nonregistrants had an opportunity to avoid prosecution by registering under
the "beg" policy. Id. at 32. Thus, the government denied any conscious selection process for prose-
cutions, and stressed that defendants selected themselves for prosecution through their persistent
refusal to register. Id.
Finally, the government argued that the passive enforcement system served legitimate purposes.
First, it allowed the government to identify and prosecute nouregistrants "with a minimal expendi-
ture of its limited investigatory and prosecutorial resources." Id. at 34. Second, it provided evidence
of the nonregistrant's intent not to comply, an element of the offense. Third, prosecuting visible
offenders was an effective way to promote general deterrence. Id.
44. Id. at 41-42. The government noted that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that pre-
cludes the government from considering a volunteered admission of guilt in determining whether to
bring a prosecution, and it does not matter whether that admission is cojoined with other statements
that come within the First Amendment." Id. at 31.
45. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1531 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
46. Id. (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a showing of discriminatory motive is not necessary when
the government has openly and flagrantly discriminated. Id. at 1531 n.10. The Court noted, how-
ever, that no such claim was presented here because Wayte could not argue that the passive enforce-
ment policy discriminated on its face. Id.
This two-part equal protection analysis is essentially the same as the Berrios test, infra note 109
and accompanying text, on which the district court and the court of appeals relied, supra notes 19 &
25.
47. Id. at 1532.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Court mentioned that no matter how vehement or outspoken the expression of
opposition to draft registration, it created no exposure to enforcement efforts unless coupled with an
indication to the government that the person had failed to register as required by law. On the other
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government "treated all reported nonregistrants similarly [without subjecting]
vocal nonregistrants to any special burden."' 50
Even if there was a discriminatory effect, the Court observed that Wayte's
evidence had failed to establish that the passive enforcement policy was moti-
vated by improper factors, the second prong of the equal protection test.51
Rather, Wayte had proved only that the government was aware that the passive
enforcement policy would result in prosecution of vocal objectors. However,
"'[d]iscriminatory purpose'... implies more than. .. intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group."5 2 Absent a showing that the govern-
ment had prosecuted Wayte because of his protest activities, the Supreme Court
held that his defense of selective prosecution failed.
5 3
The Supreme Court also rejected Wayte's challenge of the passive enforce-
ment policy on first amendment grounds for two reasons.5 4 First, the majority
noted that the government's "beg" policy removed any burden on free expres-
sion.5 5 "By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selec-
tive Service, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter
continue to protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration
immunized them from prosecution." 56 Second, the Court held that the passive
enforcement policy was justified because it furthered important governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of first amendment rights. 5 7 The policy
helped encourage prosecutorial and cost efficiency, ensure convictions only of
willful violators, and promote general deterrence.5 8 Further, it did not restrict
first amendment freedoms more than was necessary to encourage registration for
hand, the government "did prosecute people who reported themselves or were reported by others but
who did not publicly protest." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 252, 279 (1979)).
53. Id.
54. Id. In particular the Court responded to Wayte's claim that "'[e]ven though the [govern-
ment's passive] enforcement policy did not overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably
created a content-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on
nonregistrants.'" Id. at 1533 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23).
55. Id. at 1533 n.12.
56. Id. According to the Supreme Court, the only freedom denied Wayte was that of refusing
to register under the Military Selective Service Act, "a 'right' without foundation either in the Con-
stitution or the history of our country." Id. (citing Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)).
57. Id. at 1533. The majority noted that that any incidental effect of government regulation on
first amendment rights is justified
"if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
The Court in Wayte said neither the first nor third conditions were disputed. Id.
58. Id. at 1534. The reasons the government offered in defense of the passive enforcement
policy were sufficiently compelling to satisfy the second requirement of the O'Brien test, according to
the Court. Id. at 1533.
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the national defense.59 Because passive enforcement was only an interim solu-
tion designed to carry out the government's compelling interest while an active
enforcement program was being developed, the Court concluded there was no
first amendment violation.60
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan, main-
tained that the real issue before the Court was whether Wayte had earned the
right to discover government documents relevant to his claim of selective prose-
cution.61 Marshall argued that "[if the District Court correctly resolved the
discovery issue, Wayte was entitled to additional evidence. . . [and] the Court
cannot reject his claim on the merits" for lack of proof.62 Thus, the dissent
focused its analysis on whether the district court had abused its discretion in
determining that Wayte had presented a nonfrivolous showing of selective prose-
cution entitling him to discovery.
63
Marshall cited three elements of a prima facie case of selective prosecution.
A defendant must demonstrate (1) that he is a member of a recognizable, dis-
tinct class; (2) that a disproportionate number of this class was selected for pros-
ecution; and (3) that the selection procedure was subject to abuse.64 Wayte had
met the first element, according to the dissent, by showing that he was a member
of a class of vocal opponents to the government's draft registration.65 He had
presented a colorable claim as to the second element by presenting evidence that
top officials in the Justice Department were aware that the vast majority of indi-
59. Id. at 1534. Thus, the passive enforcement policy also met the final requirement of the
O'Brien test. Id.
60. Id. The Court emphasized that the Selective Service was engaged in developing an active
enforcement program when it investigated Wayte, but at that time it had found no practical ap-
proach to obtaining the names and current addresses of likely nonregistrants. After failing to obtain
a list by using Social Security and IRS records, the Selective Service eventually located the informa-
tion through state driver's license records. Id. at 1534 & n.14. See infra note 175.
61. Id. at 1535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1538 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority did not address the discovery issue,
claiming that it was not raised in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, or at oral
argument. Id. at 1529-30 n.5. Justice Marshall pointed out, however, that in addressing the merits
of Wayte's selective prosecution claim, the Court must also decide the antecedent discovery ques-
tion-whether Wayte had made a sufficient showing of a constitutional violation to be entitled to
discovery of government documents. Id. at 1538-39 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall also
noted the irony that the majority chose to address Wayte's claim that passive enforcement placed a
direct burden on the exercise of first amendment rights, even though that issue also had not been
presented in Wayte's petition for certiorari or ruled upon by the district court or by the court of
appeals. Id.
63. Id. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To be entitled to discovery, according to Marshall, a
defendant must present sufficient facts in support of his selective prosecution claim "'to take the
question past the frivolous state."' Id. at 1539 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1983)). "In general, a defendant must present 'some evidence
tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense.'" Id. (quoting United States
v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
Once a district court has ruled in favor of discovery, Marshall maintained that the decision is
reviewable only if there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus,
without a determination that the trial court acted arbitrarily or made a finding without record sup-
port, the dissent emphasized that an appellate court should not disturb a lower court's discovery
orders. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974)).
64. Id. at 1541 (Marshall, I., dissenting) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977)).
65. Id.
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viduals prosecuted would be vocal opponents of draft registration. 66 Finally,
Wayte had established the third element by demonstrating that the government
recognized that the passive enforcement policy had potentially serious first
amendment problems, making it easy to punish speech under the guise of enforc-
ing the laws.6 7 Thus, the dissent concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that Wayte had presented sufficient facts to support a
nonfrivolous claim of selective prosecution entitling him to discovery. 68 On this
basis Marshall and Brennan would have deferred a decision on the merits until a
final resolution of discovery matters had been reached on remand.
69
The Supreme Court has never invalidated a criminal conviction on the basis
of selective prosecution.70 Nevertheless, dicta in several cases prior to Wayte
laid the foundation for the defense.71 As early as 1886 in the landmark case
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 2 the Supreme Court used a selective enforcement rationale
to strike down a municipal ordinance that required all persons running laundries
in wooden buildings to obtain an operating license.73 Without addressing the
facial validity of the ordinance, the Court held that because it was administered
in a discriminatory fashion to deny licenses only to Chinese laundry operators,
enforcement of the ordinance resulted in a denial of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment.7 4 The famous rule enunciated was that
although a law may "be fair on its face and impartial in appearance... if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between per-
sons in similar circumstances, material to their rights," there is a denial of equal
protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.7 5 Thus, equal protec-
tion became the basis for the selective prosecution defense.
The Supreme Court again commented on selective enforcement of the law
in Snowden v. Hughes.7 6 Snowden, the Republican runner-up in an Illinois
state-house primary election, claimed a denial of equal protection when the elec-
tion board failed to certify him as a candidate as required by state law. 77 The
66. Id. Wayte introduced one Justice Department memorandum stating that under the passive
enforcement system "'the chances that a quiet non-registrant will be prosecuted is probably about
the same as the chances that he will be struck by lightning.'" Id. (citation omitted). See Brief for
Petitioner at 6.
67. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1542 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1543 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 677.
71. Id.
72. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
73. Id. at 357-58. In 1880 San Francisco had passed two ordinances banning commercial laun-
dries in wooden buildings unless one obtained a permit from the Board of Supervisors. Id. Peti-
tioner, a Chinese native living and operating a laundry in San Francisco, had his premises inspected
by the fire and health officials, who found everything to be in good condition. Nevertheless, the
Board of Supervisors denied his perimit. Before the Supreme Court, petitioner demonstrated that
the city had denied permits to over 150 Chinese laundry operators, although all but one of the non-
Chinese applicants had been granted permits. Id. at 358-59.
74. Id. at 373-74.
75. Id.
76. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
77. Id. at 3-4. By mutual agreement between the Republican and Democratic Parties and in
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Court dismissed the claim, noting that "unlawful administration by state officers
of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who
are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is
shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination."'78
In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGnley79 the Supreme Court
implied in dicta that selective prosecution also might be a defense to a criminal
prosecution. Appellant, a corporation that operated a large discount depart-
ment store in Pennsylvania, had sought to enjoin enforcement of a Sunday clos-
ing law based on alleged selective application of the law.80 The Court, however,
denied relief, stating that "[s]ince appellant's employees may defend against any
such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional
discrimination, we do not believe that the court below was incorrect in refusing
to exercise its injunctive powers."''s
Oyler v. Boles8 2 in 1962 was the last case before Wayte in which the
Supreme Court considered the defense of selective prosecution. Oyler had been
prosecuted pursuant to West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, which imposed
more severe penalties on defendants with prior offenses than on those with no
previous record.83 He alleged that other repeat offenders subject to the statute
were not prosecuted as habitual criminals and that his selection for prosecution
under the statute was thus a denial of equal protection.84 The Court rejected
defendant's challenge for two reasons. First, Oyler had failed to prove that pros-
ecutors had knowledge of the habitual criminals' prior offenses. Second, he had
failed to show a discriminatory motive on the part of the prosecutor.85 The
Court stated that the "conscious exercise of some selectivity in criminal law
accordance with Illinois state law, the third district nominated the Democratic candidate and the
two Republican candidates receiving the highest vote in the primary election as candidates for repre-
sentatives in the general assembly. Id.
78. Id. at 8; see also Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1953) (noting the necessity of
showing systematic or intentional discrimination for successful claim of discriminatory law enforce-
ment). The Court in Snowden suggested that the element of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion, necessary to establish a denial of equal protection of the law, may appear on the face of the
action taken with respect to a particular class or person or may be shown by extrinsic evidence, but it
is not presumed. Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8.
79. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
80. Id. at 586. The Pennsylvania statute forbade all worldly employment, business, and sports
on Sunday, with exceptions for works of charity and necessity. Id. at 585 & n.2. Appellant corpora-
tion sought an injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, alleging discriminatory enforcement
against it by the district attorney because the statute had not been enforced against other store
owners. Id. at 586.
81. Id. at 588-89.
82. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
83. Id. at 449.
84. Id. at 454-55. Oyler alleged that of six men subject to prosecution as habitual offenders in
his county, he was the only man sentenced under the statute. He also introduced statistical data
based on prison records that 904 other known offenders in the state had not been prosecuted under
the statute. Id. at 455.
85. Id. at 456. The Court first found there was no indication that the records Oyler relied upon
had been available to prosecutors. Therefore, his allegations set forth no more than a failure to
prosecute others due to a lack of knowledge of their prior offenses. Second, the court reasoned that
although Oyler's statistics might imply a policy of selective enforcement, he failed to allege that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard. Id.
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enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation... [so long as the
selection is not] deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification."186 Thus, the Court held that Oyler's
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of denial of equal protection.87
Following Oyler, the selective prosecution doctrine was applied by several
federal courts in reversing convictions and in dismissing criminal indictments.8"
For example, in United States v. Crowthers8 9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that selective and discriminatory enforcement of reg-
ulations relating to disturbances on government property violated defendants'
right to equal protection of the laws.90 Defendants had been prosecuted for
disorderly conduct for holding a "Mass for peace" on the Pentagon grounds.9 1
Because sixteen other political and religious ceremonies had been held on the
grounds in recent months without prosecution, the court ruled that defendants
had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution and shifted to the
government the burden of rebutting the inference of invidious discrimination to
suppress unpopular views. 92 After the government failed to meet this burden,
the court reversed defendants' convictions. 93
In United States v. Steele94 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a claim of selective prosecution for protestors who had
refused to comply with the census law. The court noted that mere selectivity in
prosecution is not impermissible.95 To establish the defense of selective prosecu-
tion, "one must prove that the selection was deliberately based on an unjustifi-
able standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," such as
the exercise of first amendment rights.9 6 Convicted of willful refusal to complete
a census questionnaire, Steele presented evidence that only vocal critics of the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane) (prosecution for failure to
possess draft card after anti-war protests); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972)
(indictment for refusal to complete census questionnaire after vocal demonstration against the cen-
sus); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (selective enforcement of regulation
controlling public concourse of Pentagon); United States v. Haggarty, 528 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Colo.
1981) (selection for prosecution for illegal strike based on holding union office); United States v.
Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (prosecution for wiretapping initiated only against
nongovernment employees).
89. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
90. Id. at 1080.
91. Id. at 1076. Defendants were convicted of violating 41 C.F.R. § 101-19.304 (1972) (prohib-
iting disorderly conduct on government property). Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1076.
92. Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1078. The court acknowledged that the government can regulate
and control public demonstrations, so long as it does so in an impartial manner. The government
may not, however, allow public meetings in favor of government policy while denying meetings
opposed to that policy. The court concluded, "What the government has done here is to undertake
to suppress a viewpoint it does not wish to hear under the guise of enforcing a general regulation
prohibiting disturbances on government property." Id. at 1079.
93. Id. at 1081.
94. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
95. Id. at 1151.
96. Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962)); see also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. i
(1944) (requiring allegation of intentional or purposeful discrimination for claim of selective
prosecution).
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census had been chosen for prosecution.97 The court noted that "an enforce-
ment procedure that focuses solely upon the vocal offenders is inherently sus-
pect." s9 8 Because Steele had presented evidence that created a strong inference
of selective prosecution, the burden shifted to the government to rebut his prima
facie case. 99 When the government failed to present a valid basis for its selection
of only vocal offenders, the court reversed defendant's conviction. 10 0
Similarly, in United States v. Falk01 i the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that there is a presumption that prosecution for viola-
tion of a criminal law is undertaken in good faith, but "when a defendant alleges
intentional purposeful discrimination and presents facts sufficient to raise a rea-
sonable doubt about the prosecutor's motive," the burden shifts to the govern-
ment to rebut the inference of selective prosecution.10 2 Convicted for failing to
possess his draft card, Falk alleged that he had been singled out for prosecution
because of his first amendment activities in counseling others to avoid the draft
and to protest American involvement in Vietnam.10 3 The court concluded that
Falk had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution by showing the
existence of a published government policy to refrain from prosecution for non-
possession of draft cards, his status as a public advocate of draft resistance, an
Assistant United States Attorney's statement that several high level officials had
participated in the decision to prosecute him, and the ultimate delay in bringing
the indictment.0 4 Therefore, the court remanded the case for a hearing, placing
the burden of going forward with proof of nondiscrimination on the
97. Steele, 461 F.2d at 1150-51. Defendant was convicted of violating 13 U.S.C. § 221(a)
(1972) (prohibiting willful failure to comply with census survey). Steele, 461 F.2d at 1150. He
introduced evidence that only four persons in Hawaii had been prosecuted under the statute. All
were public advocates of noncompliance with the census on the grounds that it constituted an un-
constitutional invasion of privacy. Steele also demonstrated that at least six other persons who had
refused to complete the census forms but not taken a public stand against it were not prosecuted. Id.
at 1150-51.
98. Id. at 1152. The court stated that such an enforcement policy "is vulnerable to the charge
that those chosen for prosecution are being punished for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally
protected right." Id.
99. Id. A census official testified that the census operating procedures would normally single
out all persons who failed to complete the questionnaire. The fact that the census bureau recollected
only four total refusals in Hawaii although the evidence established a minimum cf ten led the court
to infer a questionable emphasis upon vocal census resisters.
The court also remarked that the government offered no explanation for its selective enforce-
ment of the law, other than prosecutorial discretion. Yet, mere random selection would have been
appropriate, according to the court, because the government need not proceed against all offenders.
Id.
100. Id.
101. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane).
102. Id. at 620-21.
103. Id. at 617-19.
104. Id. at 623. The court reached its decision based on the cumulative weight of all the facts.
First, there was a policy statement by the Director of the Selective Service stating that registrants
who turned in their cards, as opposed to burning them, would not be prosecuted. Second, Falk was
actively involved in counseling others on legal ways to avoid military service in Vietnam. Third, the
decision to prosecute was approved by several high level officials, contrary to what the court consid-
ered normal prosecutorial policy. Finally, the indictment for failure to possess a draft card was not
brought until almost three years after Falk had returned his card to the Department of Justice. Id.
at 621-22.
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government.105
In 1974 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Benios10 6 enunciated a two-prong equal protection test to estab-
lish selective prosecution that has been adopted in a majority of the federal cir-
cuits.' 0 7 In Berrios defendant, charged with violating a federal statute by
holding a union office within five years after his conviction for a felony, con-
tended that he had been chosen for prosecution because of his unpopular polit-
ical views.10 8 The court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of selective
prosecution the defendant bears a "heavy burden" to show (1) that others simi-
larly situated generally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to defend-
ant's and (2) that the government's discriminatory selection was based on
impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional
rights. 10 9 Although Berrios' evidence of selective prosecution was weak, the
court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the
government to turn over to the defense documents relating to Berrios' prosecu-
tion.' 0 The court did remand the case, however, because of the trial judge's
failure to limit discovery solely to material in the government memoranda that
related to the defense of selective prosecution."'
In recent years the defense of selective prosecution has arisen in the context
of the government's passive enforcement of draft registration laws. Vocal critics
of the draft who refused to register have insisted that they were prosecuted
solely for the exercise of their first amendment rights. 12 Prior to Wayte the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the first amend-
ment issue in a selective prosecution claim in United States v. Schmucker.113
Schmucker, a Mennonite, informed the Selective Service by letter of his refusal
to register for the draft, explaining that registration would violate his religious
convictions.11 4 Although there were over 500,000 nonregistrants, Schmucker
105. Id. at 623-24.
106. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
107. See United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Saade, 652
F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981); Barton v. Malley,
626 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979);
United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v.
Legett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v.
Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976).
108. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1209. Berrios claimed that he was selected for prosecution because he
was an outspoken supporter of Senator McGovern's candidacy for President of the United States
and because he was heading an effort to unionize a corporation that apparently had close ties with
President Nixon. Id.
109. Id. at 1211. The court referred to these two elements as "intentional and purposeful dis-
crimination." Id. (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)).
110. Id. at 1212.
111. Id. at 1212-13. The court also set forth some general guidelines for discovery. To establish
a "colorable basis" for discovery of documents needed to establish a defense of selective prosecution,
the court announced it would "require some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential
elements of the defense and that the documents in the government's possession would indeed be
probative of these elements." Id. at 1211-12.
112. Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 685.
113. 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985).
114. Id. at 1048.
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was one of only thirteen nonregistrants indicted and convicted for willful viola-
tion of the draft registration laws.' 15 On appeal, Schmucker contended that the
district court had erred in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his
claim that the government had abridged his rights of free speech and religious
free exercise by prosecuting only vocal nonregistrants. 116 Although it discussed
the two-prong equal protection analysis of selective prosecution, the court fo-
cused on first amendment considerations.117
The court held that a prosecutorial policy directed solely at vocal nonregis-
trants violated the first amendment because it punished critics for speaking out
against the government and ignored those who engaged in covert noncompli-
ance. 118 Acknowledging that the government may prohibit certain types of
speech and may limit prosecutions in certain cases to persons confessing their
crimes, the court emphasized that absent compelling justifications, the govern-
ment's prosecution policy must be content neutral. 1 9 In response to the gov-
ernment's argument that defendant had been prosecuted simply because he
reported his violation, the court observed that defendant's letters were not mere
confessions, but were also criticisms of government policy protected by the first
amendment. 120 Thus, the court remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing
115. Id. at 1048-49. Schmucker was convicted of knowingly and willfully refusing to register in
violation of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 453, 462a (1982). Schmucker, 721 F.2d at 1048. For the text of these
sections, see supra notes 9 & 17.
116. Schmucker, 721 F.2d at 1048.
117. Id. at 1048-50. The court noted that an indictment must be dismissed on grounds of selec-
tive prosecution if (I) the defendant has been singled out from other similarly situated violators and
(2) the defendant's selection for prosecution was based on impermissible grounds such as race, reli-
gion, or the exercise of one's constitutional rights. Id. This is the same two-part equal protection
test set forth in United States v. Berrios. See supra text accompanying note 109. According to the
court in Schmucker, a defendant who makes a preliminary showing of selective prosecution is enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing. Schmucker, 721 F.2d at 1049.
The court found that Schmucker met the first element of the test by showing that out of over
500,000 violators of the registration law, only 13 vocal nonregistrants had been prosecuted. How-
ever, the court did not focus on the government's motivation in implementing the passive enforce-
ment policy, the second element of the test. Instead, the court stated that the issue before it was
whether the passive program violated the first amendment by prosecuting only vocal nonregistrants
who openly objected to draft registration on religious, moral, or political grounds. Id.
118. Id. at 1049. The court noted that the effect of passive enforcement was to discourage "dis-
senters from expressing their criticism of government policy." Id.
119. Id. at 1050. The court conceded the government could prohibit fraudulent or libelous
speech without violating the first amendment. Nevertheless, the court stated that" '[w]hen govern-
ment regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the
justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.'" Id. (citing Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
120. Id. at 1050-51. The government asserted that defendant's letter was not only an exercise of
free speech, but also "an unequivocal confession of the commission of a crime which virtually invited
the initiation of criminal prosecution." Id. at 1050 (citing Brief for the United States at 37-38,
Schmucker). The court, however, ruled that Schmucker was analogous to Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), in which the Supreme Court invalidated under the first amendment a state prosecu-
tion for disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Id. at 26. The
Schmucker court interpreted Cohen to mean that prosecution for wearing the jacket created a strong
inference that the state brought the case because of the political meaning of the slogan. Schmucker,
721 F.2d at 1051.
The court relied on Justice Harlan's warning in Cohen that "'we cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particu-
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on the issue of selective prosecution. 12 1
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Eklund 122 employed the traditional two-prong selective prose-
cution analysis in a similar draft registration case.123 Like Wayte, Eklund had
written to the Selective Service expressing his opposition to draft registration
and his refusal to comply, and he had been convicted for failure to register with
the Selective Service. On appeal Eklund contended that he was a victim of im-
permissible selective prosecution.1 24 The court accepted the district court's find-
ing that Eklund had satisfied the first element of the equal protection test by
showing that he had been treated differently from others similarly situated.125
Nevertheless, focusing on the second element, the court held that because
Eklund had not established an improper motive, he had failed to present a prima
facie case of selective prosecution. 126
Eklund cited three factors showing the government's discriminatory motive
to prosecute only vocal violators: the government's delay in implementing a
broader, active enforcement system, statements in government memoranda dem-
onstrating awareness that only vocal nonregistrants would be punished under
the passive program, and the participation of high-level executive officials in for-
mulating the prosecution policy.' 27 The court responded that it was unwilling
to infer improper governmental motive on these grounds because: the govern-
ment was implementing an active enforcement system,128 government awareness
of the adverse effect on vocal nonregistrants did not establish the intent to have
that impact, 12 9 and there was no indication that high level officials intended to
base prosecutions on vocal resistance.' 30 Because Eklund did not raise a reason-
lar words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."' Id. (quoting
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26). Applying the same reasoning to the facts of Schmucker, the court concluded
that the government was forbidding criticism of itself under the guise of prosecuting confessions. Id.
at 1051-52.
121. Schmucker, 721 F.2d at 1052.
122. 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
123. Id. at 1290. The court applied the two-prong equal protection test as set forth in Berrios.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 109.
124. Eklund, 733 F.2d at 1289.
125. Id. at 1290. Because the court disposed of the case under the second part of the Berrios test,
it did not decide whether the trial court's finding that Eklund received treatment different from
others similarly situated was correct. Id.
126. Id. at 1291.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1292. The court pointed to evidence that the government had tried and failed to
implement an active enforcement system with Social Security and IRS records. Id. at 1291-92. In
1982 the Selective Service employed an alternative active program using state driver's license
records. Given the government's long range plans to identify and prosecute both vocal and silent
offenders, the court refused to infer impermissible government motive from the temporary use of the
passive enforcement system. Id.
129. Id. at 1293. The court observed that Eklund had failed to show that the government had
declined to prosecute known silent offenders or that the government had prosecuted vocal offenders
who signed up late under the "beg" policy. Also, the court emphasized that "absent bad faith,
selectivity based upon the amount of publicity a prosecution will receive falls well within the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 1294 (citing United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir.
1978)).
130. Id. at 1295. The court did not find it unusual for high level government officials to be
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able doubt concerning the government's purpose in prosecuting him, the court
concluded that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of
selective prosecution.131
Wayte v. United States132 is significant because the Supreme Court resolved
a division in the circuits over selective prosecution and for the first time deline-
ated the appropriate standards for raising the defense. Claims of selective prose-
cution, the Court announced, should be judged according to ordinary equal
protection standards. 133
Application of equal protection criteria to selective protection cases is con-
sistent with the Court's past treatment of the defense.' 3 4 The equal protection
standards require that a person invoking the defense demonstrate that a govern-
ment policy both "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose."'135 The Supreme Court has interpreted the two parts
of this equal protection analysis in prior cases involving facially neutral statutes
that discriminated on the basis of race and gender. For example, in Washington
v. Davis136 unsuccessful black applicants for employment as police officers al-
involved in formulating policy for enforcement of draft registration laws that pertained to national
security interests and involved several thousand violators. Id.
131. Id. at 1291. The court stated that a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a claim of selective
prosecution only when he has alleged "sufficient facts to take the question past the frivolous stage."
Id. at 1290 (citing United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978)). Otherwise, the prosecu-
tion is presumed to have been undertaken in good faith. Id. at 1291 (citing United States v. Falk,
479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
The dissent in Eklund objected to the majority's ruling based on the facts. Id. at 1307 (Heaney,
J., dissenting). Focusing on the government's two year delay in implementing an active enforcement
system, the dissent reasoned that the government had an adequate opportunity to develop reason-
able, alternative methods of enforcement. Although the government had been unable to obtain So-
cial Security records with correct addresses, the dissent noted that the same information could have
been obtained from state drivers license records that had been available to the Selective Service
during the entire period in question.
In addition the dissent contended that the passive enforcement policy was applied in a discrimi-
natory manner. Although the Selective Service sent warning letters to 103 nonregistrants in June
1981, as of September 1982 only the 13 nonregistrants who had written letters refusing to register
had been indicted. Based on these facts, the dissent concluded that Eklund had presented a nonfriv-
olous showing of selective prosecution and was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. Id. at 1307-08.
132. 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
133. Id. at 1531.
134. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
135. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1531. One caveat to this rule is that a showing of discriminatory
motive is not required in those rare cases in which the equal protection claim is based on an overtly
discriminatory classification. Id. at 1531 n.10 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(systematic exclusion of blacks from grand juries is itself such unequal application of law as to show
intentional discrimination)); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (Court will infer discriminatory intent from disproportionate adverse im-
pact only when the effect of facially neutral legislation indicates a stark pattern of discrimination);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (exclusion of almost 400 black voters after redis-
tricting presumed to have been enacted to segregate voters by race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886) (denial of licenses to 200 Chinese laundry operators gave rise to inference of inten-
tional discrimination); Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 677 n.47 (Court will infer dis-
criminatory intent from the unequal effect of state action only in most compelling equal protection
cases).
The Court did not find such a claim in the present case, stating that Wayte could not maintain
that the passive enforcement program was facially discriminatory. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1531 n.10.
136. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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leged that a job-related employment test that whites passed in proportionately
greater numbers than blacks was racially discriminatory. 137 Applying an equal
protection analysis, the Court observed that "[d]isproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution." 138 A discriminatory purpose must also be
proved, although it need not be express or appear on the face of the statute.139
The Court suggested that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts." 14° Considering the affirmative
efforts of the police department to recruit black officers, the changing racial
composition of the recruit classes, and the relationship of the test to the training
program, the Court refused to infer a discriminatory purpose from the institu-
tion of the employment test even though it had a disproportionate impact on
black applicants. 141
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. 142 the Supreme Court again enunciated its interpretation of discrimina-
tory effect and purpose. A nonprofit real estate developer that had contracted to
purchase a tract of land on which it intended to build racially integrated low
income housing filed suit, alleging that local authorities' refusal to change the
tract from a single-family to a multi-family classification was racially discrimina-
tory.143 The Court reaffirmed that disproportionate impact of an official action
is relevant, but stated that proof that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor in the decision also is required to show a violation of the equal protection
clause. 14 4 The Court then proceeded to identify some objective factors that may
be highly relevant in proving discriminatory intent. These factors include the
impact of the official action, the sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision, the evidence of departures from normal procedural policy, and the leg-
islative or administrative history, possibly including official testimony, of the
statute under which the defendant was prosecuted.145 Although the refusal to
rezone for low income multi-family housing had a disproportionate impact on
137. Id. at 232-33. The police department's recruiting procedures included a written personnel
test to determine whether applicants had acquired a particular level of verbal skill. Id. at 234-35.
138. Id. at 242.
139. Id. at 241. The Court stated that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose could be
inferred from the systematic exclusion of blacks from jury selection. Id. (citing Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398 (1945)). Once the prima facie case is made out "'the burden of proof shifts to the State to
rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selec-
tion criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."' Id. (quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
140. Id. at 242. The Court indicated that it would infer discriminatory intent from a dispropor-
tionate adverse impact upon a particular group only in those rare cases in which the action could not
be explained on any nondiscriminatory grounds. Id.
141. Id. at 246.
142. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
143. Id. at 254.
144. Id. at 265. The Court noted that a plaintiff does not have to "prove that the challenged
action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes." Id. One simply has to demonstrate that a
discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" in the decision. Id.
145. Id. at 266-68. The Court stated, "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available." Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
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blacks, evidence that the present zoning classification had existed for seventeen
years, that the rezoning request had progressed according to normal procedures,
and that the Commission had gone out of its way to accommodate the develop-
ers led the Court to hold that the developers had failed to prove discriminatory
intent was a motivating factor in the decision 46
The Supreme Court enlarged upon its interpretation of discriminatory in-
tent in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.147 Female civil service employees
brought suit alleging that the Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, which
favored qualifying veterans for civil service positions over qualifying nonveter-
ans, unconstitutionally discriminated against females because of their sex.
148
Conceding that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were
foreseeable, the Court responded, " 'Discriminatory purpose,' however, implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . . . It
implies that the decisionmaker. . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."' 149 The Court held that the veterans' preference
statute did not deprive women of equal protection of the law because considera-
tion of the totality of legislative actions establishing and extending the statute
showed that the law was "a preference for veterans of either sex over nonveter-
ans of either sex, not for men over women."' 5 0 Based on these facts the Court
concluded that appellees simply had failed to demonstrate that the law reflected
a purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex.15 1
Relying on the principles set forth in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney,
the Supreme Court in Wayte concluded that no discriminatory effect resulted
from the government's passive enforcement policy,152 even though Wayte had
introduced evidence that out of an estimated 674,000 nonregistrants the thirteen
indicted under the program were all vocal nonregistrants.153 The Court noted
that the government did not prosecute those who reported themselves but later
registered under the "beg" policy, nor those who protested registration but did
not report themselves or were not reported by others. 154 These facts led the
146. Id. at 269-70.
147. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
148. Id. at 259. During her 12 year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who was not a veteran,
had passed a number of competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massa-
chusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had
achieved lower test scores than herself. Id. at 264.
149. Id. at 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)). The Court suggested that a law which has uneven effects upon particular groups
within a class does not ordinarily violate the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amend-
ment so long as the classification is rationally based. Id. at 272. According to the Court, it is only
when the adverse consequences of a law upon an identifiable group cannot be plausibly explained on
a neutral ground that the impact itself indicates a non-neutral classification. Id. at 275.
150. Id. at 280. The Court observed that there was no evidence that the veterans' preference
statute was enacted with the goal of keeping women from advancing within the Massachusetts civil
service. Id. at 279.
151. Id. at 281.
152. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1532.
153. Id. at 1529.
154. Id. at 1532. The Court noted that the government "did not even investigate those who
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majority to conclude that the government treated all reported nonregistrants
similarly, without subjecting vocal nonregistrants to any special burden. Ac-
cording to the Court, "Mhose prosecuted in effect selected themselves for pros-
ecution by refusing to register after being reported and warned by the
Government." 155
Some flaws, however, exist in the majority's reasoning. For instance, as
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, the Court limited its analysis of dis-
criminatory effect to reported nonregistrants:
The claim here is not that the Justice Department discriminated
among known violators of the draft registration law either in its admin-
istration of the "beg" policy, which gave such individuals the option of
registering to avoid prosecution, or in prosecuting only some reported
nonregistrants. Instead, the claim is that the system by which the De-
partment defined the class of possible prosecutees-the 'passive' en-
forcement system-was designed to discriminate against those who
had exercised their First Amendment rights. . . . If the Government
intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of potential
prosecutees, it cannot immunize itself from liability merely by showing
that it used permissible methods in choosing whom to prosecute from
this previously tainted pool. 156
The majority's reasoning, therefore, is incompatible with the principles set
forth in Yick Wo. 157 As Justice Marshall observed, in Yick Wo the Court prop-
erly focused on the prior official action of discriminatory denial of licenses to
individuals of Chinese origin that affected the definition of the class from which
prosecutees were chosen. 158 Marshall argued that "the referrals [in Wayte]
made by Selective Service to the Justice Department for investigation and possi-
ble prosecution played a similar role and may also have been discriminatory. s15 9
Thus, the Supreme Court in Wayte departs from Yick Wo by focusing only on
the prosecutions themselves instead of the alleged prior discrimination in identi-
fying the pool of draft registration violators.
Another inconsistency in the majority's analysis is the assertion that the
prosecution pool consisted of all reported nonregistrants, not just "vocal" nonre-
gistrants. 16° Under the passive enforcement policy, the government only prose-
cuted those who had reported themselves or who had been reported by
wrote letters to Selective Service criticizing registration unless their letters stated affirmatively that
they had refused to comply with the law." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1542-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450-51
(1982)).
157. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (reversing convictions under a municipal ordinance that prohibited the
construction of wooden laundries without a license because municipal licensors discriminatorily de-
nied licenses to individuals of Chinese origin). For a discussion of Yick Wo, see supra notes 72-75
and accompanying text.
158. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1543 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, "If the Court [in Yick Wo] had
focused only on the prosecutions themselves, as it does now, it would have found no discrimination
in the choice, among violators of the ordinance, of the individuals to be prosecuted. Indeed, all but
one of these violators were of Chinese origin." Id.
160. Id. at 1532 n.10.
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others. 161 Obviously, those who notified the Selective Service of their resistance
were vocal opponents. Likewise, a third party informant was only likely to be
aware of an individual's nonregistration if he had spoken about it.162 Finally,
Wayte demonstrated that out of over 674,000 men who had failed to register,
286 of which were known to the Selective Service as of July 1981, the thirteen
indicted were all vocal nonregistrants.' 63 Based on these facts, it is difficult to
conceive how the Supreme Court could find that the passive enforcement policy
did not have the inevitable effect of selecting for prosecution only those individu-
als who had expressed their refusal to register.
After discussing the discriminatory effect of passive enforoement, the ma-
jority addressed discriminatory motive, the second part of the equal protection
analysis. The Court found that Wayte's evidence had demonstrated only that
the government was aware that the passive enforcement policy would have an
adverse impact on vocal nonregistrants, and not that the government intended
such a result. 164 The Court reiterated its holding from Feeney that discrimina-
tory intent implies that the challenged action was selected partly because of its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.165 Absent a showing that the govern-
ment prosecuted Wayte because of his protest activities, the Court concluded
that his claim of selective prosecution failed. 166
This analysis of discriminatory intent by the Court, however, is superficial.
In Washington v. Davis' 67 the Court remarked that "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."' 168 In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolition Housing Development Corp. 169 the
Court outlined objective factors relevant to identifying discriminatory intent.1 70
The Wayte court failed to consider the totality of the relevant facts and to fully
analyze the objective factors indicating the government's discriminatory motive.
Although the Court noted that Wayte had demonstrated that all thirteen nonre-
gistrants indicted were vocal resisters of the draft and that the government was
aware of the consequences of its passive enforcement policy, 17 1 it held that
Wayte had failed to prove discriminatory motive. The majority did not address
additional factors that tended to establish an impermissible motive. For exam-
161. Id. at 1528.
162. See Note, supra note 6, at 167.
163. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1529 & n.3.
164. Id. at 1532.
165. Id. (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)).
166. Id.
167. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
168. Id. at 242.
169. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
170. See supra text accompanying note 145.
171. A memorandum by Assistant Attorney General Lowell Jensen conceded that the first pros-
ecutions were likely to consist largely of persons who publicly refused to register, which would raise
"'thorny selective prosecution claims.'" Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.9. In another memorandum
David Kline, Senior Legal Advisor in the United States Department of Justice, reflected, "'Indeed,
with the present universe of hundreds of thousands of non-registrants, the chanoes that a quiet non-
registrant will be prosecuted is probably about the same as the chances that he will be struck by
lightning.'" Id. at 6 (citing Jt. App. 290-91).
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ple, the government's normal prosecutorial policy was not followed. Ordinarily
United States Attorneys would ultimately decide which nonregistrants to prose-
cute, yet the facts indicated that a presidential advisor, Edwin Meese 111,172; a
Presidential Military Task Force; and the White House were heavily involved in
these prosecutorial policy decisions. 173
In addition, the government had adequate opportunity to develop reason-
able, alternative methods of enforcement. Between President Carter's reinstate-
ment of registration in July 1980 and the first nonregistration indictment in the
summer of 1982, the government had two years to develop a fair random selec-
tion system. 174 The government's current implementation of an active enforce-
ment policy using state drivers license records, which presumably were
obtainable during the entire period in question, indicates the prior availability of
alternative enforcement methods. 175 Although the Selective Service received au-
thority to use social security records in a similar manner in December 1981, it
abandoned the effort upon finding that the list of addresses was outdated.176
Yet, if the Selective Service had matched the data from the correct addresses
against the list of persons required to register, it would have identified a far
greater pool of draft nonregistrants than it located under the passive enforce-
ment system. 177 As the district court in Wayte concluded, "It strains credulity
to believe that the investigative agencies of our Government. . .could not lo-
cate any non-vocal non-registrants. The inference is strong the Government
could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to."'178
Wayte did not have to prove that discriminatory intent was the sole pur-
pose behind the passive enforcement policy, although the Supreme Court's rul-
ing leaves that impression. Rather, a showing that the discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor is sufficient to shift the burden to the government to
disprove purposeful discrimination. 179 Thus, the totality of the facts in Wayte
were clearly sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the government's motive in
utilizing the passive enforcement system.
One other confusing aspect of the majority's discussion of discriminatory
172. See supra note 20.
173. See United States v. Wayte 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385
(9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
174. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12.
175. Beginning in 1980 the Selective Service implemented an active enforcement system using
Social Security records and state drivers license lists to identify nonregistrants. Suspected violators
are notified twice by letter of their duty to register, and if they still do not comply, their names are
referred to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution. As of June 1984, more than 160,000
names had been transmitted to the Department of Justice and 599 individuals had been selected for
further investigation. At that time all persons subject to the registration requirement had elected to
comply with the law pursuant to the government's "beg" policy and no prosecutions had been initi-
ated. Brief for the United States at 10.
176. Eklund, 733 F.2d at 1307 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
178. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. at 1381.
179. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66,
270 n.21 (1977) (proof that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor shifts burden of proof to
other side); Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (plaintiff has burden of
showing that discriminatory purpose was motivating factor).
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effect and purpose is its failure to elaborate more on the prima facie case and
discovery issues. In Castaneda v. Partida °8 0 the Supreme Court set forth three
criteria for establishing a prima facie case of an equal protection violation in the
context of grand jury selection. The party alleging the violation must show that
he or she is a member of a recognizable, distinct class, that a disproportionate
number of this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution, and
that this selection procedure was subject to abuse or otherwise not neutral.181
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he
has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then
shifts to the State to rebut that case." 182
In Wayte the majority disposed of the prima facie case issue in a footnote,
assuming that even if Wayte did establish a prima facie case, the "beg" policy
would rebut it.'8 3 The problem with this reasoning, however, was pointed out
earlier.18 4 The "beg" policy only came into operation after the government had
identified its pool of potential prosecutees. If the government intentionally dis-
criminated in defining that initial pool, later application of the "beg" policy
would not reverse the impact of that discrimination.
Discovery was another important issue that the Court refused to resolve.
The majority reasoned that it need not address whether Wayte was entitled to
discovery of government documents because the subject was not raised by
Wayte in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, or at the oral
argument.' 8 5 Other considerations, however, suggest the need to address the
issue. For example, the grant of certiorari in Wayte focused on the conflict in
the federal circuits over the defense of selective prosecution.18 6 In United States
v. Schmucker 8 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of selective
prosecution. In a similar case, United States v. Eklund, 88 the eighth circuit
denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. Because the lower courts
180. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). A Texas prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging a denial of
due process and equal protection because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the
grand jury that had indicted him. Id. at 490. The Supreme Court said a showing that the popula-
tion of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American and that over an l1-year period only 39% of the
persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American established a prima fade case of
intentional discrimination in grand jury selection, which shifted to the state the burden of proof to
dispel the inference. Id. at 495-98. When the state failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful
discrimination with competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding
that the grand jury selection process resulted in a denial of equal protection. Id. at 501.
181. Id. at 494.
182. Id. at 495; see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 (when a prima fade case is established, burden of
proof shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permis-
sible neutral selection criteria produced the discriminatory result).
183. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1532 n.10.
184. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
185. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1530 n.5.
186. Id. at 1531. The Court granted certiorari on the question of selective prosecution,
"[r]ecognizing both the importance of the question presented and a division in the Circuits." Id.
187. 721 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985). For a discussion of
Schmucker, see supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
188. 733 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985). For a discussion
of Eklund, see supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
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apply similar tests for granting discovery orders and evidentiary hearings, the
circuit court division invited the Supreme Court's discussion of the discovery
issue in Wayte. 189 In addition, the dissent identified the need to address the
antecedent discovery question before addressing the merits of the case.
19 ° If
Wayte was entitled to obtain evidence in the government's possession, the Court
should not have dismissed his selective prosecution claim on the merits based
solely on the evidence in the record. Finally, Justice Marshall noted the follow-
ing irony: the Court chose to address Wayte's claim that passive enforcement
placed a direct burden on the exercise of first amendment rights, although that
claim was not presented in Wayte's petition for certiorari or ruled upon by the
district court or the court of appeals. 19 1 The discovery issue was clearly
presented in Wayte, and the Supreme Court should have dealt with it more fully.
From the majority's equal protection analysis, it appears that a defendant
must introduce a virtually direct showing of discriminatory motive to establish a
prima facie case of selective prosecution. The impact of such a requirement is to
place a formidable burden on those who raise the defense. Because the govern-
ment is not likely to announce publicly its intent to discriminate and defendants
are not generally entitled to discovery until they have made a prima facie case,
defendants will rarely succeed in demonstrating that their prosecution was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose. 192 Thus, the majority's decision discourages
nonfrivolous as well as frivolous selective prosecution claims except in those rare
cases in which the government has employed an overtly discriminatory
classification.
Although focusing its decision on an equal protection analysis of selective
prosecution, the Supreme Court, in an unprecedented action, also addressed the
first amendment aspects of the selective prosecution defense in Wayte. Infringe-
ment of first amendment rights may occur either through a content-based regu-
lation of speech or a content-neutral regulatory measure that incidentally
burdens speech. 193 The Court rejected Wayte's claim that the passive enforce-
ment system created a content-based regulatory system and analyzed any indi-
rect burden on speech under United States v. O'Brien,194 by balancing the
government's interest in regulation against the adverse impact on freedom of
expression. 195
The Supreme Court struck down content-based regulatory systems in Co-
189. Compare United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant cstab-
lishes right to discovery by demonstrating "colorable basis" for selective prosecution claim) with
United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing
on selective prosecution claim after showing the request is not "frivolous").
190. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1538-39 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall noted, "To the extent that the Court discusses [the
first amendment] claim on the ground that all of Wayte's constitutional claims are interrelated, it
must also discuss the threshold constitutional claim: Whether Wayte made a sufficient showing of a
constitutional violation to be entitled to discovery." Id. at 1539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 691.
193. Note, supra note 6, at 166-67.
194. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 209-13.
195. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1532-34.
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hen v. California.196 Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in the corridor of a Los Angeles
courthouse.' 9 7 The Court reasoned that the conviction rested solely upon the
offensiveness of the words Cohen used to express himself and not upon any sepa-
rately identifiable conduct that could be regulated without effectively repressing
Cohen's ability to express himself. According to the Court, the state lacked the
power to punish Cohen for the underlying content conveyed by the inscription,
"so long as there was no showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disrup-
tion of the draft."' 198 Absent particularized and compelling reasons for its ac-
tions, the Supreme Court concluded, "the State may not, consistently with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here in-
volved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense." 199
Wayte attempted to analogize his case to Cohen, asserting that his letter to
the Selective Service was political protest protected under the first amend-
ment.2°° Even though his letters contained confessions of a crime, Wayte ar-
gued that this fact did not absolve his vocal protest of its fundamental character
as constitutionally protected speech.201 He relied on Justice Harlan's comment
in Cohen:
"[Mluch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function:
it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached expli-
cation, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. We cannot sanc-
tion the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated." 20 2
The passive enforcement system, according to Wayte, was not activated by vio-
lation of the draft law or even by first amendment activity in general, but rather
was aroused only by first amendment activity conveying a particular political
message, i., "I refuse to comply with the registration requirements. '203 Thus,
he concluded that passive enforcement "inevitably created a content-based regu-
latory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on
196. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
197. Id. at 16.
198. Id. at 18. The Court emphasized that" '[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is
the right to criticize public men and measures-and that means not only informed and responsible
criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Id. at 26 (quoting Baum-
gartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)). According to the Court, "such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity... [without compromising]
the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." Id. at 24. Thus,
"'so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptability."'
Id. at 25 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
199. Id. at 26.
200. Brief for Petitioner at 17-22.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26).
203. Id. at 23. Wayte pointed out that in several instances the passive enforcement policy desig-
nated for investigation and possible prosecution persons not required to register who had written to
the Service expressing their refusal to register, including an 80 year-old retired minister and several
women. Nonregistrants who did not write such letters, Wayte argued, were ignored. Id.
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nonregistrants. ' '2 04
The Supreme Court properly rejected the analysis of passive enforcement as
an impermissible content-based regulation of speech. Although the passive pol-
icy was content-based in the sense that the government only investigated those
who wrote letters to the Selective Service stating affirmatively that they had re-
fused to comply with the law, an uncoerced and unsolicited confession of a
crime cannot be characterized as protected speech under the first amendment.
As the Supreme Court concluded, "Such a view would allow any criminal to
obtain immunity from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming
that he did so in order to 'protest' the law. The First Amendment confers no
such immunity from prosecution. '
205
In addition, from a practical viewpoint passive enforcement did not consti-
tute a content-based regulatory system, and therefore it can be distinguished
from the state conduct challenged in Cohen. In Cohen the only conduct the
state sought to punish was communication of the offensive words that defendant
used to convey his message to the public. 20 6 In contrast the government in
Wayte did not even investigate those who wrote letters to the Selective Service
criticizing registration unless their letters stated affirmatively that they had re-
fused to comply with the law.20 7 "Enforcement did not depend upon the sub-
stance of any protest against registration, the grounds of the objection, or the
political viewpoint expressed .... Nonregistrants were thus prosecuted based
solely on their 'status' as confessors rather than 'their views.' ",208 Based on
these considerations, the passive enforcement system was content neutral.
Passive enforcement was also challenged in Wayte as an impermissible indi-
rect restriction of speech. By prosecuting only those whose statements against
draft registration included a confession, the government may have produced a
chilling effect on the normal exercise of protected political protest not in the
nature of a confession. The threat of inhibiting constitutionally protected speech
along with outright confessions cannot be ignored.
The Supreme Court addressed content-neutral regulations that have an in-
direct restriction on speech in United States v. O'Brien 209 and Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.210 In O'Brien defendant
was convicted for burning his draft registration certificate before a sizable crowd
to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs.2 11 On appeal O'Brien argued
that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional because his
act of burning his registration certificate was "symbolic speech" protected by the
204. Id.
205. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1534.
206. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18.
207. Brief for the United States at 47, Wayte.
208. Id.
209. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
210. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
211. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. O'Brien was indicted and convicted for willfully and knowingly
mutilating and destroying his registration certificate in violation of 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b) (1965).
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
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first amendment. The Supreme Court responded that "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'2 12 The Court applied a
balancing test to evaluate infringements upon O'Brien's first amendment rights
against the government's interests in preventing destruction of draft certificates.
Because of the government's substantial interest in continued issuance of draft
certificates and the narrowness of the statute punishing knowing destruction or
mutilation of such certificates, the Court concluded that there was a sufficient
governmental interest to justify O'Brien's conviction.2 13
The Supreme Court again applied a balancing approach in Minneapolis
Star. The Minnesota legislature had passed a statute that imposed a "use tax"
on the cost of paper and ink products above $100,000 consumed in the produc-
tion of publications. 2 14 The statute did not on its face restrict speech, nor did
the Court find a legislative intent to do so. 2 15 In ascertaining any indirect bur-
den on speech, the Court asserted that "the appropriate method of analysis...
is to balance the burden implicit in singling out the press against the interest
asserted by the state."' 216 The Court found that in allowing the state to single
out the press for a different method of taxation, a possible effect would .be the
creation of a censor to check critical comments by the press. Although the state
attempted to justify the statute as a means of obtaining revenue, the Court con-
cluded, "Standing alone, however, [revenue raising] cannot justify the special
treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest
without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the
State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally .... ,,217 Because
Minnesota offered no satisfactory justification for placing a use tax on ink and
paper, the Court invalidated the statute on first amendment grounds.2 18
In determining whether the passive enforcement system placed an indirect
restriction on speech, the Supreme Court analogized Wayte to O'Brien.219 Ap-
plying a balancing test to weigh the justifications for the passive enforcement
policy against the burdens on the exercise of first amendment rights, the major-
ity held that the passive enforcement policy was justified because it furthered
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion. The policy helped encourage prosecutorial and cost efficiency, ensure con-
victions only of willful violators, and promote general deterrence. It also placed
212. Id. at 376.
213. Id. at 382.
214. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 578.
215. Id. at 592.
216. Id. at 586 n.7. The Court noted, "Under a long line of precedents, the regulation can
survive only if the governmental interest outweighs the burden and cannot be achieved by means
that do not infringe First Amendment rights as significantly." Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)).
217. Id. at 586.
218. Id. at 592-93.
219. Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1533-34.
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no greater limitation on speech than necessary to ensure registration for the na-
tional defense. Because passive enforcement was only an interim solution
designed to carry out the government's compelling interest while an active en-
forcement program was being developed, the Court concluded there was no first
amendment violation. 220
In applying its balancing test, however, the Supreme Court failed to con-
sider the burdens of the passive enforcement policy. By prosecuting only vocal
resisters of draft registration who had confessed, the government may have in-
hibited the expression of otherwise protected political protest. Thus, even with-
out actually imposing an extra burden on nonconfessing vocal draft opponents,
the government could achieve chilling effects, for" '[t]he threat of sanctions may
deter [the] exercise of [first amendment] rights almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions.' "221
In addition the government's justifications for the passive enforcement pol-
icy were not persuasive. First, cost savings alone fail to justify the potential
infringement of first amendment rights.222 The fact that the Selective Service
has since successfully adopted an active enforcement program demonstrates that
the costs are not prohibitive.2 23 Second, the passive enforcement policy was not
the sole means of identifying willful nonregistrants; the "beg" policy could have
accomplished the same result whether a defendant was initially singled out by an
active or a passive system. Third, prosecution of vocal nonregistrants did not
necessarily promote general deterrence because nonregistrants could correctly
assume that they could continue to ignore the law with impunity so long as they
remained silent. A much greater deterrent effect could have been achieved by
drawing media attention to the prosecution of a quiet nonregistrant. 224 Finally,
although the Court concluded that passive enforcement was the only effective
interim solution available to carry out the government's compelling interest,
there was no evidence to suggest that the Selective Service was denied access to
state driver's license records at any time as a means of implementing an active
enforcement system.225 Considering the potential chill on first amendment
rights and the less restrictive prosecutorial policies that were available, the
Supreme Court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the passive enforce-
ment system.
The Wayte decision is significant because it was the first time the Supreme
Court considered first amendment aspects of the defense of selective prosecution.
Unlike the equal protection clause, first amendment violations require no proof
of an impermissible motive. As the Court stated in Minneapolis Star, illicit in-
tent "is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. . . . [E]ven
regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exer-
220. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
221. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S.. at 588 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
222. See supra text accompanying note 217.
223. See supra note 175.
224. Note, supra note 6, at 174.
225. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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cise of rights protected by the First Amendment. '226 Thus, the Supreme Court
in Wayte leaves open the possibility that where there is a valid first amendment
issue involved in a selective prosecution claim, a defendant may be able to cir-
cumvent the harsh motive requirement of the equal protection analysis.
In Police Department v. Mosley,227 for example, defendant challenged on
first amendment and equal protection grounds a city ordinance prohibiting all
picketing within 150 feet of a public school except labor picketing. Finding the
"equal protection claim... closely intertwined with First Amendment inter-
ests,"' 228 the Court nevertheless concluded that this content-based discrimina-
tion violated the equal protection clause without reference to discriminatory
motive.229 Although Mosley involved content-based discrimination, the Court
has not prohibited extension of its holding to content-neutral regulations having
a speech-based disparate impact.
Accepting the majority's holding that defenses of selective prosecution
should be judged according to ordinary equal protection standards, cases230 and
commentaries23 1 suggest a variation on the two-prong Berrios test 232 that would
ease the formidable burden on defendants of establishing almost direct proof of
impermissible prosecutorial motive. Defendants would still have to show a dis-
criminatory effect, the first prong of the equal protection analysis. This could be
proved by demonstrating that government officials have enforced a law against
only a minority of the violators that could reasonably be identified or that the
group prosecuted is unrepresentative of the total group of violators in character-
istics irrelevant to valid law enforcement purposes. Once the defendant estab-
lishes such a discriminatory effect, a presumption of improper prosecutorial
motive arises, the second prong of the equal protection analysis. The burden
then shifts to the government to rebut the inference of selective prosecution.233
Support for this alternative approach can be found in the context of jury
selection cases. In Castaneda v. Partida234 the Supreme Court stated that to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination against a particular group in the
selection of juries a defendant must show that (1) he or she is a member of a
recognizable, distinct class, (2) that a disproportionate number of this class was
selected for different treatment from others similarly situated, and (3) that the
selection procedure was subject to abuse or not neutral. 235 The Supreme Court
concluded, "Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of
226. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592.
227. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
228. Id. at 95.
229. Id. at 102.
230. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en bane); United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
231. See Givelber, supra note 5, at 106-123; Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 693 &
n.169.
232. See supra text accompanying note 109.
233. See Givelber, supra note 5, at 106; Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 693-94 &
n.169.
234. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
235. Id. at 494-95.
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his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the
burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case." 236 This same equal protec-
tion analysis was applied to selective prosecution cases in United States v.
Crowthers,237 United States v. Steele,238 and United States v. Falk.239 In each
case the court concluded that the defendants had presented sufficient evidence to
create a strong presumption of invidious discriminatory motive, thus shifting the
burden of proof to the government to rebut the inference of selective
prosecution.240
The government may fear such a presumption will result in an onslaught of
selective prosecution claims interfering with the broad discretion normally ac-
corded prosecutors and thereby impeding effective law enforcement. The as-
sumption is invalid, however, for defendants can only establish a prima facie
case of selective prosecution by showing that a disproportionate number of a
distinct class have been singled out for prosecution by a non-neutral enforce-
ment policy and that similar offenders with different characteristics could easily
have been located. In addition, the government can rebut the inference of im-
permissible prosecutorial motive by presenting evidence that individuals were
selected for investigation and possible prosecution through a neutral and ran-
dom enforcement policy that identifies a cross-section of individuals throughout
the population of known violators.24'
The equal protection clause does not guarantee equal results to all segments
of society in the administration of laws, but rather it is designed to "achieve
equality in the administration of the process." 242 Thus, equal protection doc-
trine does not suggest that all selectivity in law enforcement is unacceptable.
For example, the IRS proceeds against vocal protestors, but it also routinely
investigates silent offenders.243 Although expression of protest increases a tax
protestor's chances of prosecution somewhat, this is not selective prosecution
because silent offenders, when discovered, are just as likely to be prosecuted. 244
Therefore, if the government employs fair procedures in the selection of the pop-
ulation from which violators are chosen for prosecution, the right to nondiscrim-
inatory administration of the laws under the equal protection amendment is
satisfied.
In conclusion, a defense of selective prosecution is necessary to protect the
principle established in Yick Wo in 1886 that even though a law is neutral on its
face, if it is applied in a discriminatory manner, "the denial of equal justice is
236. Id. at 495.
237. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
238. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
239. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
240. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
241. See Note, Passive Enforcement, supra note 24, at 694.
242. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CimunsNA PROCEDURE § 1.6(h), at 30-31 (1985).
243. Comment, supra note 6, at 778-79.
244. Id; see also United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978) (dismissing selective
prosecution claim under IRS enforcement policy); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1975) (upholding vigorous IRS general enforcement policy).
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still within the prohibition of the Constitution." 24 5 In Wayte v. United States
the Supreme Court, for the first time, announced that it is appropriate to judge
defenses of selective prosecution according to ordinary equal protection stan-
dards, requiring the defendant to demonstrate both a discriminatory effect and a
discriminatory motive.
From the majority's decision, it appears that the Court will require a de-
fendant to introduce virtually direct evidence of impermissible prosecutorial mo-
tive and that it will not permit an inference from the totality of the relevant facts
to raise a successful selective prosecution defense. Most defendants will be un-
able to meet such a formidable standard except where the government has fla-
grantly discriminated. A better approach would be for courts to shift to the
government the burden of disproving an invidious discriminatory motive where
a defendant presents a prima facie case of selective prosecution by showing that
a disproportionate number of a distinct class have been singled out for prosecu-
tion by a non-neutral enforcement policy while other violators were easily ascer-
tainable. Otherwise, selective prosecution, in the vast majority of cases, will
remain a defense in theory but not in fact, and the scales of the American judi-
cial system will remain off-balance in the administration of justice for all.
BARRY LYNN CREECH
245. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74; see supra text accompanying note 75.
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